Local Faith Community and Related Civil Society Engagement in Humanitarian Response with Syrian Refugees in Irbid, Jordan

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PHOTO CREDIT

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SUGGESTED CITATION

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There is renewed interest in the engagement of faith-based organizations in humanitarian response\(^1\), mirroring broader attention to the role of faith and faith-based action in the public sphere.\(^2\) However, a recent scoping report by the Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities\(^3\) of the role of local faith communities in supporting resilience in contexts of humanitarian crisis has indicated the dearth of knowledge regarding the interface of governmental, intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations with local faith communities in the course of humanitarian response.

The report highlighted many examples of the potential role of local faith communities in aspects of humanitarian response. However, it also indicated a number of challenges in such engagement. Despite examples of effective partnership, concerns regarding local faith communities’ ability to operate with impartiality appear a major obstacle to partnership with secular humanitarian organizations. Local faith institutions, despite their wide potential reach to affected communities, appear to struggle to connect with the language and coordination mechanisms of international humanitarian response.

However, as Peter Walker recently noted\(^4\), the documentation of such challenges remains largely anecdotal. Katherine Marshall’s pioneering work with the World Bank and Michael Barnett’s recent analyses of faith-based humanitarianism are rare examples of more systematic study. However, with the former largely focused on development contexts and the latter principally addressing international faith-based organizations, there has been little work specifically focused on local faith communities in humanitarian contexts. Consequently, while there are signs of a growing awareness of the rich potential for more purposeful engagement by humanitarian agencies with local faith groups, there is little in the way of an evidence base to guide development of effective partnership.

This study builds upon the research and practitioner partnerships facilitated by the JLI F&LC scoping survey to conduct fieldwork in the specific context of Jordan, the focus of significant humanitarian response with respect to the ongoing Syria crisis. The research focuses upon local faith communities’ current and potential engagement in humanitarian response; barriers and challenges in connecting local faith community resources to wider humanitarian response; and lessons for managing relationships between local faith communities and international actors in such contexts.

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1. THE NATURE AND RANGE OF FAITH GROUPS ACTIVE IN IRBID

CHALLENGES IN THE DEFINITION OF FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS

Faith-based organizations (FBOs) are generally characterized in the literature as “faith-influenced non-governmental organizations”\(^5\) [1] or “any organization that derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teachings and principles of the faith.”\(^6\) Defining features may include an affiliation with a religious body, a religiously oriented mission statement, funding from donors with a faith identity, and decision-making processes with reference to religious values\(^7\).

In the context of humanitarianism it has become common practice for global actors to be explicitly distinguished as secular or faith-based (or, more recently, faith-inspired) organizations. The encompassing nature of the definitions of FBOs suggested above create challenges for sustaining such categorization, however, with Barnett & Stein arguing that ‘faith’ is a source of inspiration and ideology of many organizations generally seen as secular in character\(^8\). Heterogeneity in terms of the size, formality, mission, professed mandate, and underlying motivations of groups engaged in humanitarian work creates even greater definitional challenges at the local level. This may be particularly the case in settings beyond northern, secularized contexts, where the differentiation of the secular and the religious is culturally normative.

Indeed, in the context of this study—Irbid, Jordan—theorizing and operationalizing categorization of local organizations using straightforward secular vs faith-based framing proved unsustainable. Due to the centrality and ubiquity of faith in Jordanian society, the majority of civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in Irbid can be considered faith-influenced. For example, in the interviews conducted, representatives of CSOs not formally identifying as being ‘faith-based’ commonly cited a sense of religious obligation as the driving force behind their

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motivation to do humanitarian work. Further, many staff members of the organizations acknowledged communicating and reasoning with beneficiaries using religious language. Indeed, the stated missions of many of these organizations drew on religion and entailed the promotion of Islamic values. For example, the mission statement of one organization—explicitly self-identifying as not being a faith-based entity—referred to its duty to “create a generation that believes in Islam.” While not self-identifying as FBOs, to categorize these groups as secular—and exclude them from the presented analysis—would clearly be dismissive of the determining influence of faith on their humanitarian programming.

This is not just a question of appropriate cultural contextualization of definitions of faith-based groupings. Sensitivity to categorization as a faith-based entity clearly reflected political concerns, which are considered further in section 5.

Notwithstanding these sensitivities, a number of local Muslim groups self-identified as faith-based or were referred to as such by others. These had a set of defining features. They had an overt da’wah⁹ mandate, were able to solicit funding from Gulf donors by virtue of their Islamic identity, were perceived to be affiliated with the political Muslim Brotherhood, were proficient in using religious rhetoric to promote Islamic values, and were able to mobilize mosques and other religious resources towards their programming and activities.

Additionally, a number of Christian groups and organizations were active players in humanitarian response in Irbid. These organizations routinely invoked language of religious commitment and duty when asked about their mission and motivation. However, most acknowledged the importance of modelling respect for their Muslim beneficiaries by refraining from excessive use of religious symbols or rhetoric. Christian groups who were important players in the humanitarian response included international organizations, national organizations based in Amman with branches in Irbid, local and international churches, local worship communities, faith networks, and religious figures (priests, worship leaders etc.).

In the first phase of the project—which centered on mapping the various local faith groups active in the provision of humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Irbid—we developed a set of inclusion criteria that took these realities into consideration. Organizations/groups mapped had the following characteristics 1) they were active in provision of direct services to Syrian refugees; 2) they had an office in Irbid governorate; 3) they had Irbid as the geographic focus for their humanitarian programs; 4) they were faith-based or faith-inspired and; 5) they were community-based.

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⁹ Da’wah can be defined as “a religious outreach or mission to exhort people to embrace Islam”. However, modern da’wah movements have worked primarily among Muslims as a reaction to threats of materialism, secularism, and westernization which have been perceived as having prompted an indifference to religion among Muslims. (Reference: Walker, P.E., Schulze, R., & Masud, M. K. (1995). Da’wah. In The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0182).
A PROPOSED TYPOLOGY OF FAITH-BASED GROUPS

In an effort to capture the complexity of this category of organizations and offer a more nuanced alternative to the binary of secular/faith-based, we sought to outline a typology that accounts more fully for the different forms and structures of groups with faith connections. The categories in this typology—formed by the data collected during the mapping phase—reflect a host of faith orientations and organizational structures.

1. International faith-based organizations were identified as major players in humanitarian response in Irbid. Islamic Relief Worldwide, for example, has acted as the lead humanitarian agency in a number of projects [3], and has led the World Food Program voucher distribution in Irbid, which serves more than 100,000 refugees. International faith-based organizations have extensive experience working in humanitarian response in various settings, owing to their international profile. Examples include World Vision, and Islamic Relief Worldwide.

2. National faith-influenced organizations are non-governmental organizations whose work or missions are influenced by religious beliefs. They are typically registered with the Ministry of Social Development or the Ministry of Culture. Their main offices are located in the capital Amman, with possible branches in other governorates. They may rely on local partners for implementation, especially outside of Amman. One example of a Christian faith-influenced organization is ACCTS, a national NGO registered with the Ministry of culture, whose vision is "to assist and encourage the healthy growth of the global Arab Christian Community and to improve its position in its neighborhoods, nations and regions."[4] Their relief program, established in the wake of the Syrian crisis, has relied on partnerships with four churches and one mosque for the implementation of projects that include distributions of non-food and food items, and social-emotional workshops.

3. Local faith-influenced organizations were another group with considerable contributions to the humanitarian response. These are typically formal groups with strong ties to the community and are on the ground and at the forefront of service delivery. They may self-identify as faith-based or downplay their faith identity despite a conspicuous influence of religion on their activities. The Women’s Program Center is an organization that does not self-identify as faith-based. However, having worked
for years in the community, staff recognize the importance of being “good Muslims.” Because many of their activities are geared towards women, it would have been difficult to convince families to send their daughters to the center if it was not for their reputation as devout Muslims, which earned them the trust of the community. Al-Kitab wa Al-Sunnah is another local faith-influenced organization which has been active in providing services to Syrian refugees. A Muslim organization with an explicit da’wah mandate, Al-Kitab wa Al-Sunnah has capitalized on its Muslim identity to attract Gulf donors. Human association organizations linked to the mosques (with offices on mosques’ premises), are also local faith-influenced organizations with a formal structure and an explicit faith identity.

4. Faith networks are groups of formally or informally linked faith groups working under a shared structure. One type of local structure through which aid to Syrian refugees is channeled is the zakât committees. These are networks of committees undertaking the disbursement of zakât or alms money and falling under the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. Despite variation in the way individual zakât committees work, each comprises official staff members deployed by the Ministry in addition to community volunteers who collect zakât money from donors. Another example of a faith network is the East Council of churches (Majles Al-Ka’na’es lel Sharq Al-Ordoni), an alliance of churches associated with the ecumenical World Council of Churches.

5. Informal local faith and worship communities are informal and spontaneous social groups mobilizing in the context of crisis to provide relief services and deriving their motivation from a sense of religious obligation and duty. An example is an informal network of women who share a set of religious values and beliefs which motivate them to carry out charitable activities. Laila and her friends exemplify this category. Devout Muslims who are motivated by a culture of heightened generosity and giving during the month of Ramadan, the women undertook the distribution of more than 100 food packages to impoverished families of Syrian refugees. The equivalent in the Christian faith are worshipping congregations, who through regular meetings in church—generally outside of the structure of formal worship services—organize and mobilize to provide support.

6. Local faith figures are influential leaders of their faith communities, or more generally respected figures in the community perceived as a source of moral authority. Examples are priests, worship leaders, imams, and sheikhs. In one example, a well-regarded member of the Dera’a community in Irbid volunteered to work with the coordinator of a local group to pay visits to Syrian refugee families who were forcing their daughters to drop out of school. Because he was well respected and wielded moral authority owing to his age and position in the community, he was able to exert influence on these families to retain their children in school. In another example, Abu Jihad, who regularly volunteered his time to the church’s relief program, was also active in providing spiritual and moral guidance to neglected and at risk Syrian youth.

This typology is used in Table 1 to categorize the 19 local groups and organizations identified during the mapping phase as being engaged in humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee community in Irbid.

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10 The obligation of zakât constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam. Muslims, with financial means, are obliged to give 2.5% of their wealth as zakât.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>TYPOLOGY AND SERVICES PROVIDED</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Women’s Union</td>
<td><strong>Local faith-influenced organization</strong>&lt;br&gt;Focus is on women’s empowerment, but in events of crisis (like the current Syrian crisis and previously Iraqi crisis) resources are diverted to humanitarian programming that includes psychosocial services (child friendly spaces project with UNICEF) and primary care clinics (free of charge for Syrians, small fee for Jordanians). The groups also organizes awareness lectures, empowerment workshops, and provides litigation services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Charity Center</td>
<td><strong>Faith network</strong>&lt;br&gt;Shelter and emergency relief, treatment of the wounded and the sick, education and psychosocial support to Syrian refugees.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Farouq Charitable Society for Orphans</td>
<td><strong>Local faith-influenced organization</strong>&lt;br&gt;Mission reads: “Providing special educational care for orphans and community, creating a generation that believes in Islam and social causes.” Mainly focused on caring for orphans. The group also works heavily with Palestinian and Syrian refugees, providing medical services through medical center and pharmacy. The organizations operates a school. They have provided psychosocial and emergency relief services targeting Syrian refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Voluntary Societies in Irbid</td>
<td><strong>Local faith-influenced organization</strong>&lt;br&gt;Assistance to constituent charities (via pooled fund). In addition, financial assistance to “the poor and needy and those affected by disasters and calamities.”</td>
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<td>Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugee Work</td>
<td><strong>Faith network</strong>&lt;br&gt;Some projects cater to Palestinians and Syrians, some Syrians only. Education projects tailored to females. Psychosocial services, civic engagement classes, and mother support groups. Distributions of NFIs, hygiene kits, Fls. Organized convoy of doctors, pharmacists to address medical needs of the community. Clothes banks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Programs Center Irbid camp</td>
<td><strong>Local faith-influenced organization</strong>&lt;br&gt;Serves the local community of Irbid, with emphasis on supporting women, children, and the elderly. Have remedial classes, fire drill workshops, first aid, safety trainings in collaboration with the ICRC and other NGOs. They have workshops for women (teaching knitting, workshops on rights of women).</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Association for the Handicapped</td>
<td><strong>Local faith-influenced organization</strong>&lt;br&gt;Provides in-kind assistance and acts as a distribution center, providing assistance to Syrian refugees since 2012.</td>
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<td>The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development, Irbid Community Development Centre</td>
<td><strong>National faith-influenced organization</strong>&lt;br&gt;Various projects with International organizations that include cash assistance; healthcare to the injured with handicaps; educational programs, opening of new schools; child friendly spaces with UNICEF and Intersos; NFI and Fl distributions.</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
<td>Type of Organization</td>
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<td>Family and Children Protection Society in Irbid (جمعية حماية الأسرة والطفلة)</td>
<td>Local faith-influenced organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irbid Baptist Church (كنيسة أرباد المعمدانية)</td>
<td>Informal local faith and worship communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fayha’ Mosque (Mosque and human services association) (مسجد الفيلاء)</td>
<td>Informal local faith and worship communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Kitab wa Al-Sunna association (جمعية الكتاب والسنة)</td>
<td>Local faith-influenced organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zakāt committee housed in Al-Bilal Mosque (مسجد البلد)</td>
<td>Faith network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Programs Center for Irbid Refugee Camp (مركز البرامج النسائية مخيم إربد)</td>
<td>Local faith-influenced organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zakāt Committee (Irbid Camp) (لجنة زكاة مخيم إربد)</td>
<td>Faith network</td>
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<td>Al-Binan Association for Social Development (جمعية البنان للتنمية الاجتماعية)</td>
<td>Local faith-influenced organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eidoun Charity Society (جمعية 아이دون الخيرية)</td>
<td>Local faith-influenced organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assemblies of God Church (كنيسة دوار نسيم)</td>
<td>Informal local faith and worship communities</td>
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2. RESOURCES CONTRIBUTED BY LOCAL FAITH GROUPS TO HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Local faith groups have the ability to leverage considerable resources in humanitarian response. This section lists a number of assets/resources that faith-based groups were able to mobilize in the context of this crisis.

A. SOCIAL CAPITAL

Local faith groups are significant repositories of social capital. Their embeddedness in the community allows them to form meaningful relationships and networks grounded in trust and shared norms. This in turn empowers them to be active makers and shapers of public opinion—an asset that was particularly important in the context of this crisis. Because the influx of Syrian refugees created tremendous strain on the city’s infrastructure and bred competition between the host and refugee community, tensions between Jordanians and Syrians were palpable. Local faith groups, however, have played a key role in stemming hostility against Syrians and in fostering community cohesion by regularly reminding the host community of their religious duty to provide sanctuary to incoming refugees. Imams have been crucial in dissolving tensions by encouraging the community to “welcome and support their brothers and sisters from Syria” during Friday prayers’ khutbah, the equivalent of a sermon. Sunday mass was an opportunity for priests to lead their parish in prayer for those fleeing the Syrian conflict. According to a Caritas representative, the organization called upon all partner churches to host a “prayer for Syria” and to urge parish members to pray and fast in solidarity with Syrian refugees.

Nonetheless, there were instances where by virtue of their embeddedness in the community, these groups were equally vulnerable to biases against the refugee community. Their members, too, had experienced hardship in the aftermath of the migration of Syrian refugees into Irbid. However, these instances were few compared to the general trend observed whereby faith groups had harnessed their social capital to dissolve tensions and promote social cohesion and integration of refugees in the community.

Secondly, local faith leaders are well positioned to identify the most vulnerable by virtue of their proximity to the community and their strong networks which enable them to access newly arriving refugees and identify those par-
ticularly vulnerable. Through regular sermons and prayers, faith leaders accumulate substantial knowledge about members of their community. According to a Tear Fund representative, faith leaders’ presence in distributions has been key because of their ability to identify fraudulent behavior—i.e. forged UNHCR paperwork, dishonesty among Jordanians of Syrian origin claiming to be refugees to collect benefits of refugee status, etc.

Thirdly, local faith groups’ networks and membership in interfaith alliances greatly expand their scope and reach, and lead to more coordinated humanitarian response. The loose network of Anglican churches of Irbid is a case in point. Distributed throughout Irbid, the churches serve a great geographic area—one that stretches across different neighborhoods. They are able to cross-reference and share beneficiary lists and thus coordinate work and minimize redundancy in service delivery, a feat many international agencies have failed to accomplish.

Another example of an interfaith network is one between three Muslim faith-based organizations (Islamic Center, Al-Kitab Wa Al-Sunna, and Al-Takafol) who were among the first providers of humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees in Irbid. The three organizations forged a partnership that aimed to eliminate the redundancy of service delivery that had characterized the humanitarian response in Irbid. The organizations met regularly to decide which services were deemed most necessary and to ensure that services were properly targeted and not duplicated.

B. HUMAN CAPITAL

A crisis of this magnitude created a high demand for human resources, and local faith groups were particularly advantaged because they had been able to leverage their access to large networks of volunteers in responding to the crisis. Churches, for example, were able to dispatch parish volunteers to conduct field visits and identify the most vulnerable. Their volunteers offered their time and expertise for no pay. According to the director of one Christian organization which partnered with a number of churches:

“not only were parish volunteers an asset because they were willing to volunteer their time at no cost, but they were also genuinely passionate, reliable, and honest … Other NGOs may complain about their volunteers, but we have never had this problem because our volunteers are good Christians. And since they work with a predominantly Muslim community, they feel they are representing Christianity so they are very motivated to reflect the best image possible”.

A leader in another church noted that not only does the church have access to a large pool of volunteers, but that they embody a diverse set of skills and expertise:

“the church provides an organizing structure that brings together volunteers of different backgrounds and expertise. We are thus able to pool resources under the umbrella of the church, and prepare and respond swiftly in contexts of emergency.”

The exact parallel to the concept of a parish volunteer may not exist in Islamic tradition, yet there is a strong ethos of volunteerism in Islam. The forty two zakāt committees, in charge of disbursing alms money across Irbid, were primarily sustained by the efforts of volunteers. Although the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs employs a few paid employees, the majority of the fundraising is carried out by the ‘amil ‘alayha, or zakāt collectors who are unpaid.

Laila, the coordinator of a women’s programs center, is another case in point. Her center has collaborated with an international organization on more than one occasion for implementation of projects serving Syrian refugees. However, Laila has insisted on volunteering and receiving negligible compensation for her efforts and contributions.

The leader of one Muslim Salafi organization, Sheikh Mohammed, is a wealthy businessman. Motivated by religious duty and a recognition that many Syrian refugees are in need of spiritual guidance, Sheikh Mohamed has volunteered his time to his organization which distributes aid to Syrian refugees.

These examples illustrate how the prevailing culture of volunteerism rooted in most religions has allowed local faith groups to harness their access to human capital in responding to the Syrian crisis.
C. SPIRITUAL CAPITAL

Underpinning local faith groups’ humanitarian action is spiritual capital, a unique and intangible resource that, according to Baker and Skinner, “faith groups can access for their own personal well-being, but also donate as a gift to the wider community.” Consistent with this definition, we noted two resonant manifestations of spiritual capital: first, the personal religious motivations and value-systems which propelled local faith groups’ social action; and two, the religious and spiritual sustenance faith groups provide to beneficiaries through an ability to address their spiritual needs. The intrinsic value-systems and religious beliefs of members of local groups are powerful motivators of social action. As illustrated in the emphatic account of one local group representative:

“I started volunteering after I wore the hijab and got closer to God and realized that I have a duty to God and mankind.”

Echoing this sentiment of religious obligation, one church leader stated:

“We are explicitly instructed in the Bible ‘Do not forget to do good and to share with others’. No mention is made of who ‘others’ are. So as a Christian, I do good and I help anyone in need, regardless of their religion.”

Local faith groups are suitably positioned to address the basic spiritual needs of beneficiaries. The cultural and spiritual proximity of local groups to beneficiary populations allows them to develop a good understanding of and ability to deliver spiritual services and sustenance to refugees. Additionally, in light of the inextricable link between culture and religion in this context, local groups are particularly skilled at delivering culturally appropriate basic services and are able to cater to the special cultural needs of their beneficiaries. We recorded many examples of the kind of relevant insight local groups have of needs that stem from the religious and cultural identity of their beneficiaries. One local representative, for example, highlighted the importance of tailoring interventions to accommodate the impending occasion of Eid Al-Fitr, in which it is customary for parents to gift their children new clothes. In a bid to restore a sense of normalcy to the lives of refugees, he emphasized the organization’s commitment to give out new clothes to refugees:

“Even if it is one piece of clothing only, it is still a cherished tradition that will remind them of how life used to be before the onset of the war. A return to normality—even if temporary.”

In another example, a trainer in a local faith group mentioned a series of trainings they were holding on the “etiquette of fasting”—as dictated in Islamic jurisprudence. She mentioned that women had many questions about the rules of fasting, and it was important to address those needs. The director of Eidoun Charity Society also spoke of an amendment they made to their distributions, in which they chose to give out dates, which for many is a daily staple of their Ramadan iftar meals.

Local faith groups are also able to leverage spiritual capital in helping beneficiaries cope with adversity and displacement through mobilizing faith to help them find meaning in crisis. Groups repeatedly claimed that having a common belief system and religious identity with their beneficiaries facilitated their recovery and healing. In one example, three females who worked in a small local group, held memorization of Quran sessions which they saw as a way to “impart some sense of inner peace” in many of the Syrian women who had experienced trauma back home. In other examples, although not explicitly part of the program, prayer—which in the context of an Islamic community is a regular ritual performed five times a day—was often engaged in collectively by the beneficiaries and staff together. The ritual brought together Jordanians and Syrians, beneficiaries and service providers.

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D. MATERIAL CAPITAL

We noted that a concrete and practical resource of local faith groups is their access to religious buildings—including mosques, churches, hospitals, and schools—which they have deployed in the context of the crisis towards holding distributions, psychosocial workshops, and offering shelter. Access to physical space was of great importance in light of a tremendous influx of refugees into Irbid.

As demonstrated by a Caritas representative:

“In drafting our emergency contingency plan and sharing it with the UN, they asked us are you sure you can accommodate this many refugees. We said of course we can. All our parish halls are ready to receive them, we have a network of Catholic schools, hospitals, churches. Of course we have space.”

He recounts that in Mafraq, their office is in the yard of the Latin Convent:

“The convent gave us the land for free to build our center. In the beginning, the parish was not happy we took the land, because we were using up space where they organized events and activities, for the sake of serving Syrians, but father spoke to them and reminded them of their duty towards their neighbors.”

Another representative of a local group recounts how their organization was first established:

“I remember how it all started. Who would have thought we would be working in an office in a building? We had our first meeting in the mosque. The same men in this room here and Kefah (a woman who works in the organization). We had no place to sit so we just sat on the floor in the mosque and started collecting donations from the people we knew. We had 300 dinars! That was a lot back then. We were very excited. Then we felt the
mosque was no longer a good place to meet. So we started meeting in the warehouse of the mosque. We took the warehouse of the mosque and cleaned it up and worked from there. Today we have this small building”.

Additionally, the sanctity associated with churches and mosques render them inviolable and protected spaces offering protection to vulnerable groups. Political and sectarian dimensions of the Syrian crisis have caused tensions between various groups with different allegiance. As one representative of a local faith-based group describes it:

“Christians and other minorities are considered pro-regime, but in Zaatari camp, most refugees are pro-opposition. We have had cases where the camp administration would tell us to come and take the Christians or Druze because they were afraid for their safety. Our churches receive them with open arms.”

There was wide acceptance of the idea that the church offered protection, because in Islam, “places of worship have to be respected.” In another illustration of the perceived sanctity of houses of worship, a tribal leader in one of Jordan’s small Northern villages was at feud with a Syrian man, who in fear over his life, sought refuge in the church. The representative of the faith group recounts:

“Despite the many tensions between the Syrians and the Jordanians, the tribal leader decided not to do anything to the man [after he sought protection in the church] out of respect for the place of worship.”

Houses of worship are also traditionally viewed as centers of charity giving. When asked how they were linked to the services offered by the Fayha’ mosque, two Syrian refugee women noted that the first places refugees in Irbid frequented were often the mosques since they were known to extend charity to the needy. The familiarity of the mosque, according to one of the women, made it a hospitable place to turn for assistance.

Another advantage to using religious places as centers for distributions and gathering is efficiency. Groups confirmed that having space to receive a large number of refugees, without having them line up in the street and cause chaos and congestion, was an invaluable resource. Human service associations linked to mosques are able to use mosque premises to hold large distributions, clothes banks, and other activities. When asking a representative of a Christian organization why they chose to distribute in church instead of dispatching volunteers to refugees homes with packages, he answered:

“For one, it is more efficient. Second, it is a more sensitive way to deliver services. When we sent our volunteers with food packages to homes, Jordanian neighbors would get angry and jealous seeing the volunteers carrying bags of food to the Syrians. Home visits were dangerous for our volunteers; they would get attacked and robbed. The church is a safer option because no one will disturb a church.”

Notwithstanding, the use of churches as venues for distributions and service delivery has not been without controversy. Events in which large numbers of Muslim beneficiaries were hosted in the church have occasionally generated suspicion about the motives of the church and triggered allegations of proselytism. This was especially heightened in the wake of a number of circulated videos showing evangelical groups engaging in direct acts of proselytism, provoking controversy in the larger Jordanian community.
E. FINANCIAL CAPITAL

Local faith groups wield substantial financial capital. They have access to funding for a number of reasons that include the following:

a. They are perceived as trustworthy and honest because of their faith identity;

b. They are able to draw on religious teachings, that emphasize the obligation to give zakât (alms giving) or sadaqa (charity), to motivate members of the community to donate money and other items; and

c. They attract funding from regional and international organizations with a co-religious identity.

According to a representative of the Directorate of Religious Endowments in Irbid, it is customary for organizations to have a sadaqa fund which community members donate to. This was corroborated by our visits to local NGOs whose representatives admitted that community members are more comfortable donating money when it is in the form of sadaqa or in fulfillment of their zakât obligations.

The prolific sadaqa funds among organizations that did not identify as faith-based lend further credence to the inadequacy of using a binary secular/faith framing. If a criterion of FBOs is their reliance on financial support from religious sources, then the abundance of sadaqa funds renders most organizations in Jordan faith-based.

Moreover, Gulf countries have emerged as significant actors in humanitarian response in the Syrian crisis and Sheikhs from the Gulf recurrently came up in interviews as infusers of humanitarian aid. However, there was agreement that Sheikhs felt most comfortable donating their money to groups with a faith label. According to a representative from the Directorate of Social Development, “these Sheikhs feel safe when their funds are going through Islamic organizations, because their respective leaders, who are often Sheikhs, are considered trustworthy.”

Similarly, Christian groups have heavily relied on the donations from their individual congregations; funding through regional and national networks of churches, such as the East Council of Churches and the Holy Book Society; and also through linkages to international churches, congregations, and Christian organizations.
3. PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL FAITH GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

KEY MODALITIES OF LOCAL GROUP ENGAGEMENT

International relief groups have found themselves but a few of many actors active in humanitarian response in Jordan. Local and national civil society organizations, loose and informal groups, and private donors from Gulf countries have emerged over the course of the crisis as vital players and important service providers. This multiplicity of humanitarian actors underscores the importance of engaging and working with local partners towards a more coordinated humanitarian response. In this section, we describe some of the existing partnerships that have developed between these various actors and the mechanisms through which money has been funneled and deployed towards assisting Syrian refugees. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but aims to describe the most frequent models of partnership that have materialized over the course of the crisis.

1. The most frequently observed and widely used model is that of contractual partnership. In these practical partnerships, international organizations, which are mostly based in the capital, Amman, subcontract local groups, who they seek primarily because of their access to space in which they can carry out distributions and other activities and their knowledge of the community which they can use to identify vulnerable beneficiaries. Results-oriented international agencies tend to operate through these ad-hoc one-time alliances that often end when the funds designated for the project are exhausted. These kinds of partnerships are likely to produce immediate results, which in the context of emergency situations that require immediate action are deemed most necessary. However, such alliances are problematic because humanitarian agencies utilize local groups while failing to develop their capacities, fail to draw on their experience in the design and planning of interventions, and create false expectations among beneficiaries who are often unaware of the short-lived nature of these partnerships, which end when funding ends. Most often, these partnerships lack any capacity-building component or skills-transfer.

2. Operational partnerships are a somewhat different model that grants local groups more autonomy in the implementation of interventions. In this model, international organizations who often lack offices in governorates with a high concentration of refugees may seek local groups for implementation of projects which they would like to conduct but can’t owing to their physical absence from
International groups, typically, would make a call for proposals for a specific intervention (ex. child friendly spaces (CFSs) or remedial education program) and local groups draft proposals detailing implementation and project specifics. For example, according to Fahmeya Azzam, manager of the Irbid Community Development Centre, affiliated with the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development, “INTERSOS may want to do a Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) project. We will plan the project, come up with a budget we find appropriate, come up with objectives and draft and action plan, and submit a proposal. They will then review, make revisions, and if they find their vision of the project compatible with ours they will fund the project. After, there will be a person from the organization who follows up, who oversees the activities etc.”

3. The local ownership model, observed less frequently, allows local groups greater involvement and participation in the design and implementation of interventions. In these models, local groups may be approached by international organizations, which have available funds for an intervention, and asked to conduct a needs-assessment. After collecting information upon which the intervention will be based, local groups are given autonomy in deciding what the intervention will look like and how they want to implement it. In other scenarios, international groups will announce a call for proposals, and local groups, with an idea for an intervention, will submit a proposal for a project they deem necessary for the community. These partnerships rely heavily on the insights of local groups, who are better positioned to identify gaps in services and unaddressed needs of beneficiaries. Thus, international groups—often based in Amman—will act as donors, and local groups will be empowered to prioritize and set the agenda, while continuing to be accountable to international agencies. Most local groups engaging in this kind of partnership have expressed a sense of ownership and empowerment because they feel like active decision makers whose experience in the community is recognized as valuable. International partners may occasionally dispatch representatives to oversee the work being done, and may have some presence during the implementation of the intervention, but ultimately local groups emerge as autonomous players in this arrangement.

Additional to these three main modalities of partnership, we should recognize that local groups may also act in the distinctive role of facilitators. Considerable humanitarian aid has been directed through private donors from inside and outside of Jordan. Local groups have acted as liaisons in these kinds of arrangements, linking private donors to Syrian beneficiaries. Private donors such as members of the host community, wealthy individuals and Sheikhs from Gulf countries, or other individual donors from outside of Jordan, are often motivated to assist out of a religious obligation, and local groups offer them this opportunity. A number of examples recurrently came up, in which local groups have acted as liaison between benevolent donors and beneficiaries, but their liaising activities are often not recorded as part of their work and money they receive to fund these activities usually would not go into their financial records.

According to a representative of the Directorate of Social Development, “a common, and illegal practice, is one in which people coming from abroad, wanting to donate money, use local NGOs as proxies. They approach the local NGO and specify the number of beneficiaries they are able to assist. They would also specify the criteria they are looking for in beneficiaries. However, the money channeled through the NGO is not registered, and there is no record of that money being donated. This is a problem because we need to know who is giving money and to whom. But there is no way of knowing because they aren’t recording it.”

Particularly at the outset of the Syrian crisis, wealthy business men from Gulf countries were very actively assisting Syrians refugees with cash and shelter. “They would buy entire buildings to house Syrian refugees,” according to one local representative. This form of assistance, which has waned with the protracted nature of the crisis, relied on local groups as middlemen between beneficiaries and wealthy benefactors.

CHALLENGES FACING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ESTABLISHING PARTNERSHIPS WITH LOCAL FAITH GROUPS

A substantial portion of this research focused on documenting challenges to effective partnership between international humanitarian agencies and local groups. Through in-depth interviews with internal organizations and other local faith groups, we identified the following barriers to connecting local faith group resources to wider humanitarian response.
Religious vs social work

International organizations have expressed reservations against the way local faith groups operate—namely that they are unable to separate religious from social and humanitarian work. According to a number of organizations, this inability to act “professionally” was at odds with fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality and thus a major deterrent to forming partnership. One representative of an international Christian organization makes the point that “there is a reason why work done in mosques is not registered with the Ministry of Social Development. Their neutrality is disputable because they have a clear religious agenda. They do not separate religious work from social work. We, however, orient ourselves exclusively with social work.” Interestingly, the representative of this Christian organization saw his organization’s work as different from that of other local faith groups, despite both sharing a faith-identity. In his view, his organization firmly adhered to and upheld humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality; the others however would not.

Echoing these sentiments, another representative of an international Islamic organization states “We are an Islamic organization yes but we operate as an international organization,” highlighting the perceived tensions between Islamic identity and “professionalism” associated exclusively with international organizations. She adds, “we do not discriminate for example against Christians. We are neutral and we operate in a manner similar to other [secular] internal organizations.”

Low-compliance

Many representatives of international agencies confessed that working with local faith groups was frequently frustrating because they lacked in operational capacity and technical expertise. They were in the words of one representative “primitive”.

As further demonstrated by a British representative of an international agency, “We have had trouble partnering with the churches network. They are low-compliance. They would give us poor reports and proposals, and fail to justify selection of beneficiaries.” These groups were viewed as lacking the sophisticated reporting and financial management systems to which international agencies were accustomed.

Perceptions of local faith groups as inexperienced or un-professional were not unique to international agencies. Some “professionalized” national organizations also saw themselves as different and more sophisticated than their local counterparts. One representative of a national Christian organization boasted about his organization’s professionalism:

“We are presently working with churches because they are rooted in the community. However, they are used to charity. What we are doing here is professional. We have logistics systems, procurement systems, we keep finances, we document activities. They don’t work the same way. Their work is not professional.”

He adds that his organization trusts that the priests in charge of the distributions will not steal, and so these systems—principally designed to ensure accountability—are needed not for the purpose of policing those working in the church, but rather, he contends, for enabling “professionalism”. He argues that even though these groups can be trusted, “we need to get them to operate professionally.”

For many organizations oriented with generating immediate output in the context of emergency, investing in capacity building for the purpose of engaging with local partners is time-consuming and expensive and thus a disincentive to forming partnership. Instead, to meet immediate needs, local groups are better subcontracted for implementation, explaining the popularity of top-down contractual partnerships in this response.

Notwithstanding, some representatives of international organizations have admitted that many of their local partners were “willing to learn” and “play by the rules of the humanitarian regime”. The representative of Islamic Relief noted that their local partner, the Islamic Center, has come to understand what it means to be accountable to donors, and have thus increased efforts to hire English speakers who can be tasked with writing donor reports and who can partake in trainings and workshops delivered in English.

Small-scale operations

Representatives of IOs have admitted that because local groups were accustomed to and most experienced in conducting small community-based projects, they
were ill-equipped to work on the kind of sophisticated programs international agencies engage in. During interviews, it was clear that international agencies perceived themselves as able to act more efficiently and respond more swiftly in humanitarian crises of this magnitude owing to their expertise and experience in working in humanitarian contexts. This rationale was used to justify interventions based principally on Western expertise.

Additionally, there was a perception that local groups were docile and not interested in taking part in the hectic preparations and uncertainties that accompany humanitarian response, and thus would not be open to expanding operations. According to one Islamic Relief representative:

“The local offices may not be very keen or willing to take part in many of our hectic projects (which is the case in humanitarian response). They appreciate routine so they feel burdened.”

In reference to frustration exhibited by local groups engaging in humanitarian programming, a representative describes how after the duration of her organization’s partnership with one group, they refused to apply for institutional funding and extend the partnership contract. She adds that some organizations have successfully “upped their game to play by the rules of the humanitarian regime” while others have decided they had enough. The view that faith-based groups were ill prepared to scale up was often cited as a disincentive to forming partnership.

**Charity and the rights-based approach**

Representatives of international agencies recurrently problematized faith groups’ perception of themselves as charity givers. They noted that this obviated the need for a rights-based approach in their service delivery and precluded downward accountability to beneficiaries because service provision was viewed as part of a moral transaction that positioned personnel as charity givers and beneficiaries as passive receivers. Elements of the rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance in which refugees are viewed as having an entitlement and a right to receive assistance, they claimed, were thus largely absent.

According to a representative of Islamic Relief, the organization has struggled to integrate a human-rights approach in the activities of its local partner, the Islamic Center. “They would make refugees wait for hours in
the scorching heat. They would give appointments to refugees and then fail to meet them,” she notes. Islamic Relief staff struggled to integrate a consumer satisfaction mechanism into the Islamic Center’s activities. They were only recently successful in convincing their partner of the importance of having a complaint process; a hotline was established and complaint boxes were introduced in all branches of the organization.

**CHALLENGES TO PARTNERSHIP WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR LOCAL GROUPS**

**Short-lived and ad hoc partners**

A recurrent theme that emerged from conversations with representatives of local faith groups is the short-lived presence of internal organizations, and the temporary nature of their alliances. Groups recounted repeatedly that in their experience having worked previously with IOs in the context of the Iraqi, and prior to that the Palestinian refugee crisis, IOs have had a tendency to “parachute out as fast as they parachuted in.” Because Jordan has been a host country for both Iraqi and Palestinian refugees in the past, local groups have grown accustomed to the abrupt arrival and departure of international agencies and seem to think meaningful partnerships are elusive and unsustainable.

Additionally, because they are short-lived, partnerships create problems for the organization with the beneficiaries who continue to frequent the organization to receive services only to be turned away and told funding has been exhausted. These partnerships therefore create false expectations among beneficiaries and have a negative impact on the relationship between local organizations and their beneficiaries who lose trust in them.

The account of one representative thoughtfully captures this reality:

“It creates issues in the community, because everyone here knows Al-Farouq association. They don’t know World Vision or Mercy Corps. So when their funding is exhausted and the project ends or the distribution is stopped, people will come to our organization and demand assistance which we can’t give them. We stay in the community, but they leave and take their funds with them.”

The shifting priorities of many IOs further add to creating false expectations among beneficiaries which, when unmet, become a problem that local groups are left to deal with. In one example, an international organization suddenly decided to end one of the programs, targeting Palestinian refugees, because they ran out of funds. “This was a catastrophe because we had ongoing classes, so we lost a lot of our credibility with the community,” explained one respondent when their international partner decided to shut down one of their projects. She went on to explain that “the local community placed a lot of pressure on us.” When asked why their partner opted out, she said “They were under great pressure because of the Syrian crisis so maybe they decided they want to put their money in responding to the Syrian crisis instead.”

**Implementing partnerships preclude consultation**

Local groups noted that international agencies often approach them with a specific type of partnership in mind, one in which they are the ones dictating the agenda with little consultation or discussion. As articulated by one group:

“We are not big fans of IOs. We don’t like to work with organizations in administering distributions and services that would have us be mere channels of delivery.”

Nonetheless, some groups were fine with being used as entry points into the community and “a means through which [IOs] are connected with beneficiaries”. At least in these situations, they would be able to deliver assistance to refugees which in light of the overwhelming influx of refugees and the drying up of funding is becoming increasingly difficult. The majority, however, expressed a strong desire to be included in the planning and development of interventions, and wished for more participatory partnership with IOs that would draw from their input and local knowledge.

**Redundancy blamed on international groups**

Local groups were very vocal in their frustration with the lack of coordination of the humanitarian response in Irbid and the ensuing redundancy in service delivery that has characterized the response. They complained that IOs do
not know what they want, and have had a tendency to mimic each other’s activities which has resulted in great duplication of efforts. One representative points out:

“In my experience, 90% of IOs do not know what they want. They follow each other. One hears the other is distributing fans, so they start their own fan distributions. Suddenly, you have three organizations doing fan distributions in the same geographic area, so one refugee ends up with three fans. In the end, we would get refugees coming to us here and trying to sell us one of the fans!”

International organizations are politically motivated

Speaking to the role of international agencies in humanitarian response, a representative of a local organization tellingly suggested ‘What is the mandate of these humanitarian organizations but that of garbage collector that follows behind every crisis to which the USA has contributed?’ Local groups confessed that they do not trust international agencies that they see as having a vested interest, one that goes beyond a “humanitarian imperative”, in the crises of the Arabs (Syrian, Iraqi, Palestinian etc.).

The representative of one group stated they were not looking for partnership with IOs other than UN-affiliated agencies, because engaging international organizations can come with strings attached. This deep suspicion of international agencies often stemmed from the perceived implication of the West in many of the Arab world’s problems.

Accepting local groups’ Islamic identity

Many local faith groups are keenly aware that contemporary fears of Islamism and terrorism place them under great scrutiny from the government. They also recognize Western agencies’ reticence to engage organizations whose religious beliefs underpin their humanitarian programming. Against this backdrop of increased suspicion of Islamism and its association with terrorist activity, many organizations have found it imperative to downplay their faith identity and dismiss the influence of faith on their work in hopes of accessing foreign funding. This was evident in the accounts of many organizations who overzealously emphasized their commitment to separating the spiritual from the professional. Others, however, capitalized on their Islamic identity to access a different mar-
ket of donors. They were aware that their Islamic identity would preclude partnership with Western agencies, but were fine knowing they had alternative means to secure funding. In an interview with the Sheikh running one organization, when asked about his readiness to partner with international agencies, he asserted:

“We have no problem in partnering with organizations. However, they would not like to partner with us. Let us not play games here. We are Islamists. They would not be looking for partnership with Islamists, would they?”

“International organizations have made things worse” Jordan has historically served as a host country for many refugees from the Arab world. However, the country’s infrastructure is hurting substantially from the additional influx of Syrian refugees. As aforementioned, the relationship between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is strained, and Jordanians see Syrians as a burden on the country’s infrastructure and economy.

Competition over limited resources has exacerbated these tensions, with many local groups referencing the increase in prices of rent and commodities as disproportionately affecting Jordanian poor who are unable to access UN assistance like their Syrian counterparts. International agencies, in this scheme, are seen as culprits who, by virtue of their lack of knowledge of Jordan, have made the situation worse by injecting money and driving the increase in prices (for example, paying rent that is higher than the norm). One local actor recounts that in the be-
gination of the crisis, landlords would displace entire Jordanian families to host Syrians, after learning that international agencies were willing to pay higher rent prices.

A representative of a community-based organization adds:

“Jordan’s poor are particularly vulnerable because they are not the main beneficiaries of the services provided by these international agencies, and they are the ones most hurting from the prices which the refugees and the agencies have driven up.”

In response to this phenomenon, the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development has urged international agencies implementing projects in Jordan to dedicate 30% of their services towards serving Jordan’s poor and vulnerable, but not all organizations contracted by these agencies actively honor this quota. Thus the current acrimonious relationship between Jordanians and Syrian refugees is seen by many local groups as having been caused by international agencies who have exacerbated the rift between the two populations by selectively targeting Syrians for assistance.

COMPETITION AND RIVALRY AMONG LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HORIZONTAL COORDINATION

Donor proliferation in the context of the Syria response has had serious implications for horizontal coordination. Growing competition over funding has resulted in an absence of information sharing and a reticence on the part of local groups to engage in coordination efforts that would require them to exchange information about their beneficiaries, sources of funding, and interventions. On one hand, this has resulted in duplication and overlap in many activities and functions. On the other, it has resulted in gaps in services, which no groups were offering. One representative of a local group recounts that her organization relied on buses provided by another local NGO to transport students as part of an informal education program established for Syrian children. However, she soon learnt that the organization was planning to partner with an international agency to create a similar intervention. She notes that “they knew where the buses would collect our children, so they tried to steal them from our program.” This rivalry between groups further manifests in an anecdote by one of the local groups about a Saudi Arabian Sheikh who was willing to donate funds towards establishing a mechanism for cross-referencing beneficiaries to avoid duplication. The local groups were immediately resistant to such efforts. They knew their access to beneficiaries was a comparative advantage which they could use to attract donors and international agencies.

The various affiliations and allegiances of local groups have further intensified competition and complicated coordination efforts. The influx of Gulf donors, for example, has exacerbated tensions between explicitly Islamic groups relying on Gulf funding and Christian organizations. According to a Caritas representative, the organization had begun encountering problems with “the advent of Sunni groups from the Gulf who would come in front of Caritas doors and tell people not to seek services from Christian organizations when there are Muslim ones willing and able to help them.” Groups who were known to be affiliated with the transnational Muslim Brotherhood were also negatively perceived by other local groups for their ability to access funding from outside of Jordan. One leader of a local organization, in reference to the Muslim Brotherhood, notes “they’re the biggest organization in the Arab world. They have a huge network and they have funds coming from God knows where.”

Coordination has been further hampered by the burst of local groups established in the wake of the Syrian crisis, which has rendered mechanisms for information sharing and planning among local groups logistically difficult. The coordination meetings and the various working groups that were only recently established in Irbid have excluded most local groups partly because the sheer number of players now meant the meetings can no longer physically accommodate this many people. Most local groups reported not having participated in any coordination meetings or working groups, and international agencies interviewed attributed the reported lack of participation to the multiplicity of groups involved in the response.
4. UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF FAITH AND HUMANITARIANISM

Many of the above challenges may be understood as characteristic of difficulties in establishing a linkage between any local and international entities for the purpose of humanitarian response. Do issues of faith and religion contribute any unique challenges to the establishment of such relationships? This section considers evidence that there are, indeed, a number of ways in which faith plays out particular challenges for local organizations engaging in humanitarian response.

The prevailing political context discourages explicit religious identification

As noted earlier, the current political context of the Middle East renders religious identification an issue of considerable sensitivity. This includes concerns that Protestant Christian organizations may engage in proselytism in a manner that undermines Muslim affiliation. However, in the context of the Arab Spring and subsequent political instability, it is focused most fundamentally on a concern regarding Islamic extremism. This concern was seen to influence both donor and Jordanian government processes and decision-making in terms of approvals and partnerships.

A secular script privatizing religion to the realm of personal motivation for humanitarian engagement has been widely adopted

When exploring the role of faith and faith identity in discussions with local organizations those that had partnered with international organizations frequently articulated a clear ‘script’ regarding the public, professional work of the organizations being separate from private, personal motivations for humanitarian engagement. Religion was relevant to the latter sphere, but not the former. Indeed, international humanitarian organizations reported that training on such issues was part of their strategy for partnership development with local faith-based groups.

In meetings with local faith groups during the course of the research it was typical for this ‘script’ to be clearly articulated in the early stages of discussion, particularly when discussions were seen as potentially relevant to securing partnership with, and funding from, international sources. As discussions continued it was common for alternative ‘scripts’ to emerge which integrated religious language and sensibilities within an account of provision of humanitarian assistance.
When explicitly asked about the role of faith in informing their humanitarian programming, one CSO representative denied any role of religion, emphasizing their commitment to “professionalism” and “neutrality” despite subsequent admissions to the pervasive role played by religion in informing their activities and defining their personal motivations and those of the organization at large. In another example, a coordinator of a community center stated that “religion should be personal. It should not affect professional decisions”. However, after later probing, they noted “values in Islam are embedded in our everyday lives and naturally they have informed the services we provide,” highlighting the difficulty representatives of civil society face in separating between faith and humanitarianism, which are intricately intertwined given the cultural and religious context of this community.

There is evidence of this script marginalizing religious sentiments and resources potentially relevant to effective humanitarian response

Expectations of the secular framing of humanitarian work by international agencies potentially does more than impose a linguistic schizophrenia on local faith actors. Rather, it risks marginalizing or, indeed, ignoring key factors in determining the effectiveness of local humanitarian initiatives.

There were a number of examples where religious discourse and resources had enabled seemingly effective intervention with respect to particularly challenging humanitarian issues at the local level. For example, one respondent noted:

“When women suffering from gender-based violence come to me, I tell them you have rights in Shari’ah law. Islam clearly says that your men should not abuse you. CEDAW\textsuperscript{13} has nothing to do with my messages. I do not use CEDAW to convince these women they have rights. I use something incontestable: the Quran. I tell them a hadith that commands men to take care of their wives and ‘do good unto them’. I tell them that in the age of the prophet, women were judges and businessmen and they had the freedom to ask for divorce. Does that make me an Islamic organization or a secular organization? Neither…. all the people I am helping are Muslims who believe in the same thing I do.”

Another phenomenon common among the Syrian refugee community is early marriage. Due to economic hardship and prevailing beliefs that women should not be exposed to the outside community, many families have forced their daughters to drop out of school, and have married them off at a very young age. Local groups have been keen on combating this phenomenon and their \textit{modus operandi} has been to borrow from religious teachings that forbid forced marriage and empower girls and women to take part in decision-making.

Targeting interventions to girls and women is not an easy task in the context of a conservative community, and convincing families to send their daughters to receive vocational training is not simple. However, because local groups have legitimacy that derives from their faith-affiliation, they are better positioned to persuade parents to send their daughters to these centers. One representative stated:

“We have traditions and beliefs. When you tell families ‘please send your daughters because we have services for them that are for free (knitting, handiwork etc.)’ families

\textsuperscript{13}CEDAW is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
would be alarmed and suspicious. They may be scared we have boys in the center for example. However, when they know we are good Muslim women running the center, they trust us with their daughters."

It is noteworthy that many of the mapped organizations offered seminars and workshops addressing women’s rights in Islam—as dictated by Islamic jurisprudence. Since addressing a taboo issue like this one using assertive secular rights-based language would only serve to alienate beneficiaries, these workshops allowed groups to address a controversial issue because it was done using an Islamic framework, and in the context of Islamic teachings. However, much of this work remained ‘invisible’ to international partners, or was reported in the most generalized ‘cultural’ terms, for fear of eliciting concerns regarding the promulgation of religion.

A number of faith groups exhibit commitment to missionary activities but mechanisms serve to limit the potential for coercion

Da’wah and the role of co-religious identity

Da’wah can be defined as a “religious outreach or mission to exhort people to embrace Islam”. Many contemporary da’wah movements, however, have placed the focus of their work on Muslim populations in reaction to threats of secularism and Westernization, which are seen as responsible for exporting practices and conceptions incompatible with Islamic culture. Different manifestations of da’wah and a range of da’wah activities were documented throughout this research. Most groups, however, did not explicitly refer to their activities as part of an overarching da’wah motivation. Instead, Muslim groups and agencies saw their work as inspired by a communitarian approach to aid, which allowed them to reach out and cater to the special needs of their beneficiary populations through a shared religious identity and belief system. Thus, Quran memorization and recital sessions, distributions of Islamic literature and leaflets, and the leadership of refugees in rituals of worship were generally perceived not as a means to re-Islamize communities of Syrian refugees but to cater to their particular spiritual needs.

An exception, however, was Al-kitab Wal Sunna organization, whose leader—a Salafi sheikh—emphatically announced his organization’s deep-seated commitment to da’wah. In the predominantly Muslim governorate of Irbid, this entailed strengthening the faith of the Muslim beneficiary population. Since Al Assad’s regime routinely cracked down on Sunnis with ties to Islamist groups and proclaimed itself a stronghold for secularism, most Islamists believed his regime had polluted the way Syrians practiced Islam through promoting a version of Islam imbued with secularism. In response, Al-Kitab Wal Sunna NGO, with funding from a number of Qatari and Saudi groups and individuals, undertook da’wah with the goal of guiding Syrians towards practicing a Salafi conception of Islam that would “bring them back into the right path”. Activities included distributions of the Quran and other Islamic literature, periodic sessions on Islamic jurisprudence, and Quran recitation. The “spiritual relief” provided by the organization was deployed alongside other services that included rent reimbursement, cash payments, and in-kind assistance.

Da’wa is additionally theoretically inherent in the work of the zakāt committees undertaking the distributions of alms. According to a representative of the Directorate of Religious Endowments and Islamic affairs—the body tasked with regulating the various zakāt committees in Irbid—eight categories of people are listed in the Quran as eligible to benefit from zakāt funds. One of the eight groups is “Al-Mu’alla’afatu Qulūbuhum”—recent converts to Islam or those sympathetic to the Islamic faith who wish

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to convert. Although individuals subscribing to Christianity are ineligible for zakāt—but eligible for sadaqa funds, Christians who are considering converting to Islam qualify as legitimate recipients. The extent to which this practice can be used as a tool for da’wah is unclear, since there was no evidence that zakāt committees were disbursing alms to attract converts. It is also noteworthy that zakāt committees would set up sadaqa and other non-zakāt funds from which non-Muslim beneficiaries can benefit.

While it is not the purpose of this section to detail legal measures aimed at separating proselytism and humanitarian work in Jordan, it is nonetheless worth noting briefly that the government deploys mechanisms to “manage” organizations with political and/or religious agendas. According to an interviewee working with the Directorate of Social Development, the Jordanian government has enacted regulatory mechanisms, through its Law on Societies, which implicitly ensure the separation—programmatically and ideologically—of religious motivations and humanitarian work among non-governmental organizations registered with the Ministry of Social Development.16 He refers to law 33 of 1966 and subsequently law 51 of 2008 and its 2009 amendments, which require organizations to receive permission from relevant ministries prior to undertaking activities in the Kingdom. These laws, he believes, provide a mechanism to evaluate organizations’ underlying intentions and ensure that no political or religious goals are furthered through their activities. The laws also require groups to submit a detailed specification of their functions and activities to ensure the promotion of the “public good”. Additionally, foreign organizations seeking to conduct activities in Jordan are allowed registration in Jordan provided their aims are deemed neither political nor religious.

16 This law however does not govern informal groups or zakāt committees and mosques, which are registered with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
Despite receiving a license to undertake humanitarian activity in Irbid, Al Kitab Wal Sunna organization has been subject to “frequent harassment by the government” which its leader attributes to the group’s Islamist identity. He believes that probes by officials regarding the organization’s sources of funding and frequent government audits of its records are ways of policing groups, like his, whose relief activities are intermixed with propagation of Salafi Islam. Other NGO leaders agreed, however, that the dominant religious character of many local NGOs and their religious motivations have not received much attention from the government. Instead, groups whose primary goal is to propagate radical Islam are ones who have elicited the suspicion of the Jordanian government. This is intimately related to and easily located within a wider political context in which Islamic extremism and terrorism are issues of concern to the state.

Christian evangelism

Christian NGOs responded to probes about missionary activity and discussions of evangelism with notable caution. According to Caritas and World Vision employees, rumors of international agencies involved in missionary work combined with the circulation of videos showing evangelical groups engaging in proselytism created a heightened tension in the community and threatened Christian entities’ activities in Jordan. In addition, newly established Islamic organizations—“awash with funds from Gulf states”—have encouraged beneficiaries to reject assistance from “the Christians”, further complicating the landscape of humanitarian assistance for groups with a Christian identity.

International and national Christian organizations interviewed maintained that they were committed to a strict removal of any forms of proselytism from their humanitarian programs, and stressed their dedication to principles of non-discrimination and neutrality. Church relief efforts, on the other hand, were not always devoid of conversionary impulse. As one volunteer who leads the relief activities of his church noted, the church is ultimately a place of worship and thus entirely removing religion from the delivery and distribution of assistance is an unreasonable expectation. When his church partnered with two national Christian organizations to deliver relief services to Syrian refugees, one of the two partners emphasized the importance of “separating” religious work from relief activities and required the church to refrain from distributing any theological resources to beneficiaries:

“Their [the partner’s] distributions were different. They did not allow
This expectation was met with unease by parish volunteers who said they felt they were missing “an opportunity to teach Syrians about Christ.”

In an interview with their partner in Amman, there was a strong consciousness of the dangers of engaging in proselytism and a recognition that in light of the deeply religious character of the host community, attempts to delink religion from relief efforts were politically prudent. Nonetheless, despite their partner’s commitment to this separation, church leaders were given the freedom to invite beneficiaries with curiosity and unanswered questions about religion to the church after the conclusion of the distributions. Only then were clergy permitted to speak the language of religion and would the church be able to resume its role as a religious place.

Through their other partnerships, however, church volunteers had liberty—in fact, they were urged—to include bibles with packages to familiarize beneficiaries with Christian teachings. The recognition that Syrian refugees “were coming out of hardship and wanted to hear something that will make them feel patient in the face of adversity” motivated the church members to encourage refugees to engage in prayer in the church.

Christian religious groups wishing to undertake charitable work are referred to in article 29 of the Law on societies, and are entitled to carry out activities that include “the establishment of a shelter, an educational institute for the needy, or a community center for the poor; the distribution of financial or in-kind assistance in a regulated fashion; the provision of medical treatment or care; and other similar social services which support the public good.” The article stipulates that their services, however, must not “compromise the [Muslim faith].”

The presence of Christian evangelical groups were neither unequivocally rejected nor entirely welcomed by Jordanian NGOs. Some viewed their contributions to humanitarian response as needed in light of funding shortages, and noted the ways in which Syrian refugees have purposefully engaged with evangelical scripts in order to access resources made available by these groups while continuing to “retain their Islamic identity” (as expressed by the leader of one NGO). A minority of NGO workers, however, were concerned that Christian groups were diluting refugees’ Islamic identity and exploiting their vulnerability. Nonetheless, there was general agreement that beneficiaries were not powerless or passive recipients of assistance, that they deliberately and actively tapped into resources made available by Christian organizations through accommodating the presence of evangelicals and engaging with evangelical scripts.

The leader of a local group, which has partnered with an international Christian organization on more than one occasion, recounts an incident that sheds light on the dynamics between local and Christian NGOs whose partnerships blossomed over the course of the ongoing Syria response. When her organization received a shipment of clothes from their partner’s “friends from overseas”, she was displeased to discover that most of the clothes were inscribed with crosses. Not wishing to let the clothes go to waste, she decided to distribute them among Christian Palestinians in the Husn camp, which was overwhelmed with an influx of Syrian refugees. That way, she believed, she could still make use of the donated clothes by redirecting assistance to another vulnerable group. When a similar situation unfolded in the Women’s Program Center, which was partnering with a Christian organization, the director allayed the staff’s concerns by urging them to cut out any visible religious symbols off of the clothes, and proceed to distribute them. In both cases, the women agreed that it was best to make use of these resources and continue working with their Christian partners.

17. http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/jordan.html
5. LESSONS LEARNT AND EMERGING BEST PRACTICE

Our research points to numerous examples of contributions best made by local faith communities in the context of humanitarian response. However, challenges to effective engagement of local capacity and barriers in connecting local faith community resources to wider humanitarian response persist in the current response to the Syrian crisis. We draw from challenges and opportunities identified to suggest some practical actions for humanitarian agencies to more effectively partner with religious groups.

**Commit to mapping the breadth and diversity of faith-based engagement in local humanitarian response**

As illustrated, a wide range of local faith groups are active in the provision of humanitarian services. Recognizing the need to collaborate with a full range of groups with various organizational structures and faith orientations is a first step in building cooperative relationships. An initial phase of mapping faith-based engagement and identifying the range of services and activities provided by existing local faith groups is therefore needed prior to building partnerships.

**Model respect for such engagement through physical presence with diverse faith actors**

The deliberate exclusion of local faith groups and their alienation from wider humanitarian response compromise any commitment to engaging with local civil society in Irbid. Groups with faith orientations constitute a substantial bulk of local capacity, and any commitment to engage local civil society actors must take into account the pervasive influence of faith and religion on their programs and interventions. A mature understanding of normative humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality entails the recognition of the vital role played by local faith groups in their respective communities. Partnership and presence with diverse faith actors are key steps in building meaningful relationships and delivering effective interventions.
Recognize the religious and spiritual concerns of these groups as integral to their identity

International agencies must recognize the importance of accepting the religious and spiritual concerns of local faith groups. Imposing a secular script on local partners presents two major challenges. First, this framing often shapes humanitarian assistance in a manner that is alien to many local faith communities, thus undermining valuable contributions that could have otherwise been made possible by their faith identity. Second, silence on matters of faith is not an undisputed signal of neutrality; rather it reflects a particular ideology adopted by the humanitarian sector. It is therefore important that international agencies interested in partnership create space for the different languages and identities of their partners to emerge and coexist alongside theirs.

Adopt a mature understanding of the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality—acknowledging the values and agendas that all organizations bring to humanitarian response—to weigh fears of proselytism and religious extremism amongst some groups

Throughout the study, there was a noted reticence among a range of agencies to engage with faith groups out of a concern that they are unable to separate religious from humanitarian work. Presumptions regarding such separation impose a western secular framing on actors in settings where religion is inseparable from personal and public practice and obligation. Suspicions about faith groups’ tendencies to engage in proselytizing activities or extremist activities may in some instances have foundation, but cannot be used as a pretext for broader non-engagement with faith actors. With growing awareness of how the values and agendas imported by international agencies also serve a threat to humanitarian principles, there is a clear need for more open dialogue between secular and faith-based actors nationally and internationally. At a local level, such dialogue should enable differentiation between religious groups operating outside of acceptable standards and those merely adopting a religious perspective on issues that agencies have become familiar being framed in secular terms.

Treat such groups as partners with precious local knowledge rather than contractors to deliver a pre-determined intervention

Humanitarian agencies must recognize that there is a range of partnerships to be made with faith-based groups that go beyond implementing partnerships and ad hoc collaborations which erode the authenticity and autonomy of local groups by forcing them to respond to predetermined funding objectives (that may or may not be consistent with the priority needs of their beneficiaries). Essentially, tying funding to specific objectives and programs that are determined centrally and not collaboratively can undermine the ability of local faith groups to respond to the actual and particular needs of their beneficiaries. Local faith groups should be involved in the design, planning, and implementation of interventions, and partnership models that emphasize their inclusion across the project management cycle should be favored in place of contractual partnerships. Efforts to build capacity must be predicated on an understanding that such groups have precious local knowledge and experience that should be leveraged towards responding to community need.
ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY

This research comprised two phases. In the initial mapping phase, local groups and organizations supporting humanitarian response within Irbid, Jordan were identified. Irbid was selected as a municipality with a strong engagement with Syrian refugees which, given the distance from formally established camp structures in Zaatari and Azraq, was predominantly conducted through existing organizations. The mapping of groups and organizations was facilitated by contacting international humanitarian organizations represented within the JLIF&LC who had established partnerships with local entities in Irbid. Once contacted, local contacts provided information on other groups and organizations operating in the area through a ‘snowball’ sampling methodology.

Information regarding sectoral focus, scale of activities, and geographic reach were collated for each of 19 organizations identified by this methodology. Information on each was obtained by way of online searches and document review; interviews with international NGO staff; and visits to, and interviews with, local groups and organizations.

Information addressing the following questions was collected for each group:

1. What are the kinds of services provided by the organization/group to the refugee impacted area?
2. Since when have these services been offered?
3. How many beneficiaries has the organization/group assisted each/this month?
4. What is the geographical reach/coverage of the work of the organization/group?
5. Is the group formally licensed as an NGO?
6. What is the primary source of funding for the work of the organization/group with refugee impacted areas?
7. Are there other significant sources of funding for the organization/group for such work?
8. What is the size of the budget/financial support for the organization/group’s work in refugee impacted?
9. Are there formal partnerships with other international humanitarian actors?

In the second, investigative phase of the study, representatives of 17 of these 19 faith-based groups and other civil society organizations were interviewed and their input was sought in regards to a series of questions regarding mission and partnership. A protocol prompting discussion of these questions was drafted with input from senior technical staff of international faith-based organizations, and submitted for approval by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board. Questions considered:

1. The role of faith in inspiring the group’s mission and vision;
2. Challenges and opportunities afforded to the group by their faith identity;
3. The group’s current and past experience in collaborating with international humanitarian agencies.

In-depth interviews were supplemented with on-site observations to triangulate findings.

Additionally, interviews were conducted with international NGO staff (from World Vision, Islamic Relief and TearFund) and local government officials (representing the Directorate of Social Development and the Directorate of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs) focused upon the current engagement of local faith groups in humanitarian response.

Subsequently, preliminary findings were shared for review with participants, which included local faith groups in Irbid and the World Vision and Islamic Relief offices in Amman. Revisions to the draft report were made on the basis of feedback, and incorporated in all study outputs.
ANNEX II: FURTHER DETAILS OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL FAITH GROUPS INTERVIEWED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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</table>
| The Women's Union                                 | • Established in: 1981  
• Humanitarian services provided: Focus is on women empowerment, but in events of crisis (like the current Syrian crisis and previously Iraqi crisis) resources are diverted to humanitarian programming that includes psychosocial services (child friendly spaces project with UNICEF), primary care through clinic (free of charge for Syrians, small fee for Jordanians). The group also organizes awareness lectures, empowerment workshops, and provides litigation services.  
• Number of beneficiaries assisted: 30–40 per day, and 50% or more are Syrian.  
• Geographic reach/coverage: Branches are all over Jordan. This one branch operates in the town of Irbid.  
• Sources of funding: For-fee services generate profit. Main funds come from the central office in Amman  
• Formal partnerships: UNICEF, UBP (Italian), Local Save the Children |
| Islamic Charity Center                            | • Established in: 1963, and registered 1965  
• Humanitarian services provided: Shelter and emergency relief, treatment of the wounded and the sick, education and psychosocial support to Syrian refugees.  
• Geographic reach/coverage: More than one branch in Jordan. This one serves Irbid  
• Sources of funding: Have had funding from a series of Gulf donors, individual donors, and international organizations  
• Estimated annual funding: 26,232,865 dinars or 37,052,069 dollars have been spent since the beginning of the Syrian crisis  
• Formal partnerships: UNHCR, UNICEF, Islamic Relief |
| Al-Farouq Charitable Society for Orphans          | • Established in: 1991  
• Humanitarian services provided: Mission reads: “Providing special educational care for orphans and community, creating a generation that believes in Islam and social causes.” Mainly focused on caring for orphans. The group also works heavily with Palestinian and Syrian refugees, providing medical services through medical center and pharmacy. The organization operates a school. They have provided psychosocial and emergency relief services targeting Syrian refugees.  
• Number of beneficiaries assisted: 1500 Jordanian and 4000 Syrian families.  
• Geographic reach/coverage: most active in Irbid camp  
• Sources of funding: 52% of the funds come from their own projects (e.g. school, health centers, theme park). 44% of the funds come from the local community (in the form of donations), and the remaining small portion comes from IOs.  
• Estimated annual funding: Around one million JD  
• Formal partnerships: Taiwan Chamber of commerce, Mercy Corps |
| Union of Voluntary Societies in Irbid             | • Established in: 1956  
• Humanitarian services provided: Assistance to constituent charities (via pooled fund). In addition, financial assistance to “the poor and needy and those affected by disasters and calamities.”  
• Geographic reach/coverage: Branch in Irbid  
• Sources of funding: Members’ contributions, individual donations, ministry of Social Development  
• Formal partnerships: The union is composed of 259 representatives of charities in the province |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization/Program</th>
<th>Established in</th>
<th>Humanitarian services provided</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries assisted</th>
<th>Geographic reach/coverage</th>
<th>Sources of funding</th>
<th>Formal partnerships</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Near East Council of Churches Committee for Refugee Work</td>
<td></td>
<td>Main projects cater to: 1. Palestinians and Syrians 2. Syrians only. Education projects tailored to females. Psychosocial services, civic engagement classes, and mother support groups. Distributions of NFIs, hygiene kits, FIs. Organized convoy of doctors, pharmacists to address medical needs of the community. Clothes banks.</td>
<td>around 400 Syrian families. The medical campaign served 400 Syrians.</td>
<td>Husn refugee camp and Irbid more generally</td>
<td>International churches from abroad and networks of regional churches (churches from Jerusalem, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Women’s Programs Center Irbid camp</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Serves the local community of Irbid, with emphasis on supporting women, children, and the elderly. Have remedial classes, fire drill workshops, first aid, safety trainings in collaboration with the ICRC and other NGOs. They have workshops for women (teaching knitting, workshops on rights of women).</td>
<td>Around 400 per month. They have another branch in the Irbid camp that assists another 100 beneficiaries a month.</td>
<td>Mostly Irbid, but we have people sometimes coming from Mafrak, and other neighboring areas</td>
<td>UNRWA was the initial sponsor of the center. They have been cutting the budget given to the center. However the center has been seeking other sources of funding, though partnerships with WV, IRC, Princess Basma donation.</td>
<td>UNRWA -Has partnerships with WV, Majlis Al Kana’es (Churches council), Ministry of planning, Princess Basma Center</td>
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<td>North Association for the Handicapped</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Provides in-kind assistance and acts as a distribution center, providing assistance to Syrian refugees since 2012.</td>
<td>About 3000 to 4000 per month</td>
<td>Not restricted to Irbid. Beneficiaries come from North Jordan (villages near Irbid etc.)</td>
<td>Mostly The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD); LWF has projects in partnership; Denmark Government donation</td>
<td>Lutheran World Federation, Danish agencies, the Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development, Irbid Community Development Centre</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Various projects with IOs that include cash assistance; healthcare to the injured with Handicap; educational programs, opening of new schools; child friendly spaces with UNICEF and Intersos; NFI and FI distributions.</td>
<td>In the thousands</td>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>Funding comes from IOs and from national aid.</td>
<td>UNICEF, Intersos, USAID, Handicap, Save the Children Jordan, Save the Children International, World Vision</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Established in</td>
<td>Humanitarian services provided</td>
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<td>Geographic reach/coverage</td>
<td>Sources of funding</td>
<td>Formal partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family and Children Protection Society in Irbid</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Services offered to refugees since 2011; protecting vulnerable children and families, proposing legislations and conducting studies on issues relevant to family and childhood, and working on the protection of women against violence. Services for Syrian refugees in particular include child friendly spaces, relief services, cultural activities, human rights trainings, unofficial education programs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF is the biggest source of funds</td>
<td>Mercy Corps, WV, International relief and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid Baptist Church</td>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution of food and non-food items.</td>
<td>300 families per month</td>
<td>Irbid and surroundings</td>
<td>ACCTS, donations from community and churches</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arab Center for Consulting and Training Services (ACCTS), Refugee Relief Program</td>
<td>They started operations April 2013</td>
<td>Relief department (serves Syrian refugees and 10% Jordanian needy families): 1. Education 2. Distribution of food and non-food items 3. Medical Assistance 4. Social-Emotional Workshops (SEW).</td>
<td>In six months they had helped 400 women through their psychosocial services, 6,000 families were given food items, and 1000 families were given NFIs.</td>
<td>Irbid and surroundings</td>
<td>Tear Fund, ZOA, and World Renew (all faith-based)</td>
<td>They are formally partnered with 4 churches (one in Husn and three in Irbid) and one mosque</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fayha’ Mosque (mosque and human services association)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Registers refugees, carries out clothes distributions, cash assistance to new arrivals</td>
<td>300 families are assisted through ACCTS project alone.</td>
<td>Irbid and surroundings</td>
<td>ACCTS (ZOA, TearFund, World Renew); Donations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Kitab Wa Al-Sunna Association</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provides food items, furniture for new arrivals, cash payments, medical assistance, rent reimbursement.</td>
<td>2000 Syrians per month (403 of which are families); and 4000 orphans are supported financially</td>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zakat committee housed in Al-Bilal Mosque</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provides cash assistance to needy families. Many beneficiaries are Syrians—many donations earmarked for Syrians.</td>
<td>1000 families overall.</td>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>Individual donations (zakat)</td>
<td>This is strictly based on zakat money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Established in:</td>
<td>Humanitarian services provided:</td>
<td>Number of beneficiaries:</td>
<td>Geographic reach/coverage:</td>
<td>Sources of funding:</td>
<td>Formal partnership:</td>
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<td>Women's Programs Center for Irbid Refugee camp</td>
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<td>Provides skills-based trainings, computer classes, remedial education courses. They serve the local community as a whole. Specifically, they have sponsored 500 Syrian families through provision of NFIs, school uniforms, remedial classes, psychosocial services, women’s rights workshops.</td>
<td>About 500+ Syrian families</td>
<td>Mostly Irbid refugee camp</td>
<td>UNRWA, Majlis al Kanaes (Churches council), the Arab women network, UNICEF, JAICA</td>
<td>UNICEF, USAID projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zakat Committee (Irbid Camp)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provides cash to needy families. These include Palestinians coming from Syria. Assistance to Syrians has shrunk, because of the massive influx of Syrian refugees. Also provides meals in Ramadan on a daily basis. The organization undertakes renovations of poor houses, distributes NFIs, FIs, and administers Quran distributions.</td>
<td>13 Palestinians from Syria. Total of 500 families receive a monthly allowance, 1000 families get coupons for NFIs. 74 orphans receiving a kafalah.</td>
<td>Irbid camp</td>
<td>Individual donations (zakat)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Binan Association for Social Development</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Houses nursery for children, kitchen to teach cooking classes. Provides beauty and cosmetics, and knitting workshops; Quran memorization classes; fiqh lessons (Islamic Jurisprudence) targeting Syrian women.</td>
<td>10,000 Syrian families are registered. However, the organization has communicated with and helped 2000 in total.</td>
<td>North Irbid mostly, but Irbid as a whole</td>
<td>Individual donations from the community of North Irbid and the founder of the organization who is a businessman.</td>
<td>One partnership with Italian organization INTERSOS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eidoun Charity Society</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beauty salon; Park; Nursery; Revolving credit; Solar energy projects; NFIs; Remedial classes; Health awareness; Child protection workshops; kitchen for catering services, libraries for children, and courts</td>
<td>5000 registered Syrian families.</td>
<td>Irbid in Irbid</td>
<td>Profit-generating activities, IOs, funding from Saudi Arabia for the health centre (sheikh in Saudi Arabia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assemblies of God Church</td>
<td></td>
<td>Distributions of NFIs and FIs; Cash Assistance</td>
<td>Minimum 150-200 per week. Sometimes 600-800 people a week.</td>
<td>Irbid (network of churches)</td>
<td>Papal Society, international churches, donations, ACCTS (ZOA etc.), Bible Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 Kafala is "the commitment to voluntarily take care of the maintenance, of the education and of the protection of a minor, in the same way a parent would do for a child"—from the International Reference Centre for the Rights of Children Deprived of their Family (ISS/IRC), "Specific Case: Kafala," Fact Sheet No51, (Geneva: ISS, 2007)